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AFTER TEN YEARS, 
SARBANES-OXLEY MIGHT BE 
STATUTORY OVERKILL 
Harvey Gilmore* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
he start of the twenty-first century brought with it some 
spectacular corporate accounting scandals: Enron, World-
Com, Adelphia, and Tyco, to name a few. The subsequent 
congressional hearings investigating the accounting and ethical 
failures of these companies resulted in a parade of one corporate 
executive after another claiming they had no knowledge of the 
massive fraud in their firms. In response to this rapid-fire 
succession of corporate scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).1 It is a statute first introduced by 
Senator Paul Sarbanes and Congressman Michael Oxley, and 
signed into law by President George W. Bush in July 2002.2 The 
two major problem areas that SOX sought to remedy were 
personal accountability of corporate managers and that of auditor 
independence. As a result, SOX created the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”),3 an administrative 
agency charged with the responsibility of establishing audit 
standards for publicly traded companies. 
In this essay, I will argue that there are some provisions 
                                                          
        * Professor of Taxation and Business Law at Monroe College, The Bronx, 
New York; B.S., Hunter College of the City University of New York (1987), 
M.S., Long Island University (1990), J.D., Southern New England School of 
Law (1998), LL.M., Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center (2005). I 
deeply thank the wonderful editors for their help, generosity and friendship in 
publishing this article. 
 1  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 2  Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Signs Bill Aimed at Fraud in Corporations, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 31, 2002, at A1, available at Factiva, Doc. No. 
nytf000020020731dy7v00039. 
 3  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §101, 15 U.S.C. §7211, (2002). 
T 
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within SOX that wrongfully make the innocent suffer for the 
guilty. I will first look at Section 206, which prohibits an auditor 
from taking a position with a client for at least one year after 
participating in an audit of that same client. I will next look at 
Section 203, which requires that an auditing firm rotate its 
partner if it worked with a specific client for the previous five 
years. Finally, I will look at Section 304, which requires the Chief 
Executive Officer (“CEO”) and Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) 
of a publicly traded corporation to disgorge their profits if the 
financial statements must be restated due to fraud. In doing so, I 
do not mean to suggest that enacting SOX was unnecessary or 
unsuccessful; I am merely pointing out that even a right motive 
can sometimes yield a harshly wrong result. 
II. AUDITOR CONFLICTS OF INTEREST                      
UNDER SECTION 206 
An auditor has always been required to be independent 
from the client whose financial records the auditor examines. An 
auditor cannot be an advocate for the client’s position,4 like an 
attorney would. An auditor, after examining the client’s books, 
gives a professional opinion as to whether the client’s financial 
statements give a fair representation of the client’s financial 
position.5 Consequently, the auditor gives external users the 
assurance that the financial statements are free of any material 
misstatements or omissions that would perpetrate a fraud on the 
investing public.6 
A. The Problem: Lack of Auditor Independence 
A very large factor in the high profile cases of accounting 
fraud was that that auditing firms (and audit partners) enjoyed 
close relationships with the clients whose records were being 
audited. This arose from auditing firms offering additional 
services to the same clients (tax preparation and management 
consulting, among others). 
This practice embedded the large audit firms in deeply 
incestuous relationships with their clients, impairing their 
                                                          
 4  Arthur B. Laby, Differentiating Gatekeepers, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 119, 124 (2006). 
 5  Id. at 125. 
 6  Id. 
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independence. As examples, Ernst & Young developed a business 
partnership with its client, PeopleSoft; some of KPMG’s illegal 
tax shelters, for which it narrowly escaped criminal indictment, 
were provided to clients and their audit committee members; and 
both KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers owned investments in 
their audit clients. Auditors also impaired their independence by 
performing for audit clients non-audit services that generated 
considerable revenue compared to audit revenue. Impaired 
independence reduced auditors’ reputations as watchdogs, which 
likely tempted many managers to indulge in accounting 
aggressions.7  
As a matter of fact, Arthur Andersen (“Andersen”), 
Enron’s not-so independent auditing firm, received $27 million in 
tax and consulting fees in addition to $25 million in audit fees. 
Those fees were paid by Arthur Andersen’s highest profile client, 
Enron.8 
Sometimes, the relationship between the auditor and the 
client can be closely personal as well. For example, when the 
truth of Enron’s creative accounting practices came to light, it 
also exposed the chummy relationship between Rick Causey and 
David Duncan. “David Duncan and Rick Causey often 
vacationed together, annually leading a group of Andersen and 
Enron ‘co-workers’ on golfing trips to elite courses around the 
country.”9 Causey was Enron’s Chief Accounting Officer, and a 
former partner at Arthur Andersen, which was Enron’s auditing 
firm; Duncan was Andersen’s audit partner who handled the 
Enron account.10 
Naturally, when one has a business arrangement 
                                                          
 7  Lawrence A. Cunningham, Symposium: Litigation Reform Since the 
PSLRA – A Ten Year Retrospective: Panel Two: Sarbanes-Oxley Accounting 
Issues: Too Big To Fail – Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to 
Restructure the Industry Before It Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1713-
1714 (2006). 
 8  William O. Fisher, Lawyers Keep Out: Why Attorneys Should Not 
Participate in Negotiating Financial Numbers Reported by Public Company 
Clients, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1501, 1519, n.57 (2010) (It was “reported that in 
the year 2000 Andersen was paid [by Enron] audit fees of approximately $25 
million and nonaudit fees of approximately $27 million.”). 
 9  Matthew J. Barrett, In the Wake of Corporate Reform: One year in Life 
of Sarbanes-Oxley – A Critical Review Symposium Issue: “Tax Services” as a 
Trojan Horse In the Auditor Independence Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 463, 484 (2004). 
 10  Harvey Gilmore, This is Not a Symposium on How to Commit Fraud – 
But, if it Were. . ., 11 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 199, 217 (2011). 
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commingled with personal friendships, it could lead to a potential 
situation where a person may have to choose between doing his 
job right and potentially alienating his friend. “An auditor who 
suspects errors or misstatements, whether intentional or not, must 
choose, perhaps unconsciously, between harming a known 
individual and likely the auditor’s own self-interest by 
questioning the accounting, or injuring faceless others by failing 
to object to the possibly incorrect numbers. Such biases only grow 
stronger as personal relationships with the client’s management, 
sometimes former auditing colleagues, deepen.”11 
B. The Solution: Sarbanes Oxley Section 206 
Section 206 (1) of SOX provides the following: 
It shall be unlawful for a registered public accounting 
firm to perform for an issuer any audit service required 
by this title, if a chief executive officer, controller, chief 
financial officer, chief accounting officer, or any person 
serving in an equivalent position for the issuer, was 
employed by that registered independent public 
accounting firm and participated in any capacity in the 
audit of that issuer during the 1-year period preceding 
the date of the initiation of the audit.12 
In order to ensure that there is complete independence 
from the client, Section 206 of SOX expressly prohibits an auditor 
from taking any accounting related job with that same client if 
the auditor recently participated in an audit of that client in any 
capacity.13 The statutory cooling off period requires that the 
auditor wait for a minimum of one year after concluding the 
audit before taking an accounting job with the client.14 
C. One Potential Injustice of Section 206 
For purposes of Section 206, what does the phrase “in any 
capacity” really mean? In the normal sense, participating in an 
audit in any capacity refers to an auditor checking various 
                                                          
 11  Barrett, supra note 9, at 484. See also, Max H. Bazerman, George 
Lowenstein, and Don A. Moore, Why Good Accountants Do Bad Audits, 80 
HARV. BUS. REV. 97, 100 (2002). 
 12  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §206, 15 U.S.C. §78k(f) (2002). 
 13  Id. 
 14  Id. 
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aspects of a client’s financial practices. The auditor will look at 
things like the client’s general ledgers, bank reconciliations, 
cancelled checks, tax records, and payroll records, among 
others.15 
If one takes the phrase “in any capacity” literally, then it 
means just that . . . anything that an individual does within the 
scope of an audit can now trigger Section 206 to that person’s 
detriment. For example, an accountant who is working on his 
very first audit might just make tick marks in the daily audit plan 
to show that everything on that day’s schedule has been 
accounted for. Or there might be someone whose only function is 
to file paperwork. Or, there might be a rookie accountant who is 
on an audit as an observer, and his job is to get coffee and 
doughnuts for the rest of the team. 
If “in any capacity” is taken literally, Section 206 lends 
itself to this unjust result: For example, I am young accountant 
who takes a job in the audit department of a public accounting 
firm. I work with the firm for six months, and I actually 
participate in an audit. I was never in any kind of executive 
decision-making capacity whatsoever. My only audit duty is to 
look at the client’s cancelled checks to make sure that they are 
countersigned by both the controller and chief financial officer, 
pursuant to the client’s internal control policy. I go through a 
sample of 1000 checks, and I find that each check has both 
required signatures, which I properly document and report to the 
audit partner. This is my only exposure to doing audit work. 
A short while later, the client offers me a job in the client’s 
tax department, and I love doing tax work much more than I 
liked auditing. I would prepare income tax returns, sales tax 
returns, and property tax returns (as I actually did in my 
accounting days). As such, my immediate supervisors would be 
the controller and chief financial officer. Not only would I be a 
mid-level employee who would not be in a financial oversight 
position, but because of my doing primarily tax work, I would 
also have limited contact with my new employer’s external 
auditing firm. 
Unfortunately, this would be a pipe dream for me 
precisely because Section 206 precludes me from taking the tax 
job with the client. As I see it, this is grossly unfair to those 
similarly situated young accountants starting out who have not 
yet found their professional niche. 
                                                          
 15  See Gilmore, supra note 10, at 215. 
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This unfortunately cripples young accountants who not 
only cannot freely make career choices but are effectively forced 
into retroactively paying for corporate misdeeds that happened 
while they might have been undergraduates (or younger). And, 
those same professionals starting their careers who are now 
foreclosed by Section 206 from pursuing viable career 
opportunities have no remedy to fix their predicament. This is 
just wrong! 
D. Another Potential Injustice of Section 206 
Let us assume that Jane Doe (fictitious) is a Certified 
Public Accountant (“CPA”) who is an audit partner at Deloitte 
and Touche (“Deloitte”). Jane has been with the firm for the past 
12 years, and has been an audit partner for the past four years. 
Jane has developed an unassailable, sterling reputation within the 
accounting profession, her clients speak very highly of her, and 
her performance evaluations are outstanding. Over the years, she 
has participated in the audits of several high profile Deloitte 
clients, including AT&T, Cablevision, IBM, General Electric 
(“GE”), and Citigroup. 
Jane was the lead auditor when Deloitte audited GE in 
February 2012. Jane had audited GE on more than one occasion, 
and there is absolutely no question of her integrity or her 
professionalism. She always maintains a professional demeanor 
and there is no question of her independence from her clients. In 
addition, we will also assume (for purposes of this discussion, and 
I have no reason to believe otherwise) that GE’s internal controls 
and accounting practices give an absolutely accurate picture of 
the firm’s financial condition. 
On July 1, 2012, the CEO of GE offers Jane the position of 
CFO, at a salary of $1 million per year, plus bonuses and stock 
options. Unfortunately for Jane, through no fault of her own, she 
cannot accept GE’s job offer precisely because of the provisions 
of Section 206. I believe that this is a grievously unfair, unjust 
result. While it is true that Section 206 seeks to strengthen auditor 
independence, I strongly believe that Section 206 wrongfully 
penalizes innocent people and innocent firms. 
First, I believe that Section 206 wrongfully prevents a 
person in Jane’s position from making a living consistent with 
her academic and professional credentials. What happens if this 
was a once in a lifetime offer for Jane’s dream job? She is now cut 
off from it because Section 206 is, as I see it, a strict liability 
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section. Strict liability means “liability without fault.”16 If we 
apply strict liability to a situation like this, it means that one does 
not need to prove that Jane was negligent in accepting the offer, 
or that she acted in bad faith, or committed any malfeasance. The 
mere fact that Jane accepted the offer within one year of her 
auditing General Electric is enough for Section 206 to step in and 
keep her from taking the job. 
Secondly, what does Jane do in the interim? Once Jane’s 
partners at Deloitte find out about her offer from GE, they 
probably would not be too happy. The partners could 
conceivably vote her out of the partnership, thus constructively 
(and actually) firing her. If she were a staff accountant who 
wasn’t yet a partner, the firm most likely would have fired her. If 
GE truly wants Jane and is willing to wait for her, the company 
could give her a signing bonus equal to her annual salary, making 
it worthwhile for Jane to wait out the one year period before 
actually starting work. A less realistic possibility would be for 
Jane to start working for the company immediately, for the same 
salary, but at a much lower job than CFO. Imagine the next CFO 
working for the firm in the interim as a mailroom clerk, or 
receptionist, or executive secretary. Obviously, these are jobs far 
beneath Jane’s professional skill set. Otherwise, Jane’s only other 
alternatives would be to look for a job in another CPA firm, or a 
corporation that she last audited more than one year ago, or look 
for a job at Wendy’s putting salt on french fries. Admittedly, my 
Wendy’s reference here is an extreme example, but it also points 
out a potentially absurd result because of Section 206. Sadly, this 
is a situation people in Jane’s position would be forced into as a 
result of Section 206. 
Thirdly, I am unconvinced that the one year requirement 
is necessary. If the client is above board, and the auditor was 
both competent and independent in performing the audit, I 
cannot think of a better marriage than an upstanding auditor 
going to work for an equally upstanding, transparent client. For 
me, this is a clear case of both parties having nothing to prove, 
and more importantly, even less to hide. In my opinion, there are 
not many people that a firm could hire better than an auditor 
who recently audited the firm and already knows that the 
financial statements are legitimate.  The firm would be getting an 
employee whose competence, professionalism, and veracity are 
proven. 
                                                          
 16  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1422 (6th ed. 1991). 
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It is very unlikely that there would be a reverse situation 
where an auditor missed red flags that would have uncovered a 
fraud and then goes to work for that same firm later on. The 
auditor takes a job with the client as the controller, and while 
working as the controller, he notices many accounting 
irregularities that he missed while he was the client’s lead 
external auditor. When he reports the irregularities to his 
superiors, they notify him that he has a choice: either restate the 
financial statements and expose himself and his former firm to 
malpractice liability, or just keep quiet and go along. 
Unfortunately, he is now forced to choose between a bad option 
and a worse option.  
Of course, if something like that was to happen, the guilty 
parties must suffer the consequences. While I understand that the 
rationale for Section 206 is well-meaning, I believe for the reasons 
stated above that it is overbroad to the point that it wrongly 
condemns honest, current practitioners for the “sins of the 
fathers,” so to speak. Additionally, Section 206 completely 
disregards the fact that there are honest, diligent professionals 
who maintain their independence at all times. 
III. AUDIT PARTNER ROTATION UNDER SECTION 203 
Section 203 of SOX provides the following: 
It shall be unlawful for a registered public accounting 
firm to provide audit services to an issuer if the lead (or 
coordinating) audit partner (having primary 
responsibility for the audit), or the audit partner 
responsible for reviewing the audit, has performed audit 
services for that issuer in each of the five previous fiscal 
years of that issuer.17 
In financial accounting, one of the generally accepted 
accounting principles is consistency. Consistency means that “a 
company uses the same accounting principles and methods from 
year to year.”18 If a business, along with its accountants, honestly 
conducts its affairs the same way every year and is successful 
every year, it only makes sense to stick with what works. As the 
                                                          
 17  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §203, 15 U.S.C. §78j-1 (2002). 
 18  JERRY J. WEYGANDT ET AL., ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES, 274 (10th ed. 
2010). 
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old adage suggests: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”19 
Similarly, if you have an honest company along with an 
honest, and independent auditing firm, and the result is a 
competent, professional audit and reliable, trustworthy financial 
statements, I do not see much sense in putting a time clock on a 
good business relationship of veracity and integrity. Thanks to 
Section 203, a firm is now required to change its audit partner 
every five years. Again, I believe this is overreaching. 
I see a couple of potential problems with Section 203. 
First, if we take a literal reading of the statute, it becomes illegal 
for the same partner to lead audits with the same client for more 
than five consecutive years. If that is the case, this presents a 
possible scenario where the partner and client can agree after the 
fifth year that the partner will step aside in year six, and then 
take the reins again in years 7 through 11. Conceivably, the 
partner and the firm can have this kind of arrangement in 
perpetuity where the partner “takes a year off” every so often and 
then comes back. I do not know exactly how ethical this kind of 
arrangement might be, but I do not see anything in the statutory 
language that would make this arrangement illegal, either. 
Next, I also see Section 203 as an unfair constriction of the 
freedom to create a contract. In its most basic form, a contract is 
an agreement for which the law gives a remedy.20 “I will do A for 
you and you will do B for me.” In the auditor-client relationship, 
the auditor will examine various financial aspects of the client’s 
business and the client will pay the auditor for the service 
provided. That is their contract. As in any transaction, if the 
bargained for exchange is satisfactory on all sides, the contracting 
parties would conceivably want to do business again in the 
future. This is no different in the auditor-client relationship, 
which by necessity is to be an arm’s length relationship. 
Obviously, I’m not talking about a buddy-buddy relationship like 
Enron’s Causey and Andersen’s Duncan, or a situation where a 
member of the client’s management is having a romantic affair 
with a member of the audit staff. The compromise of auditor 
independence in those types of situations goes without saying. 
In the typical arm’s length relationship between the 
                                                          
 19  See, e.g., THE FREE DICTIONARY, at 
http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/if+it+ain’t+broke,+don’t+fix+it. 
 20  See, e.g., ROGER LEROY MILLER & GAYLORD A. JENTZ, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF BUSINESS LAW 153 (8th ed. 2010) (“A contract is an 
agreement that can be enforced in court.”). 
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auditor and client, the auditor doing an honest, thorough, and 
professional job is what will often result in a repeat engagement, 
and a good working relationship between the parties. Most often, 
the thing that brings clients back every year is doing satisfactory 
work and not being a yes-man always telling the clients what 
they want to hear. There is any number of good, long standing 
contractual relationships where the professionalism and 
competence of the parties involved are not compromised, such as 
the principal-agent, lawyer-client, doctor-patient, employer-
employee, and trustee-beneficiary relationships. The auditor-
client relationship should be no different. 
I can imagine the outcry that would result if a federal law 
was enacted that every person had to change his or her doctor 
every five years. The very idea of having one’s proctologist, 
oncologist, cardiologist, OB-GYN, etc. on a statutory rotation 
basis is nothing short of asinine. 
For example, a patient with a chronic disease has been 
going to the same doctor for ten years. This doctor has performed 
surgery on this patient several times and knows this patient’s 
history like the back of his or her hand. Without this doctor the 
patient could have died ten years ago, but they have not, because 
the patient trusts they are in good hands. The same goes for a 
client. Clients do not want to be tossed around to a new auditor 
every couple years who does not know who the client is and what 
the client has been doing. Clients want to trust their auditors are 
competent and thorough. With audit rotation, it limits these 
possibilities and causes more harm to all parties involved.21 
Thanks to SOX, this is the very same thing that the law is 
requiring of auditing firms and their clients. I believe this result is 
just as ridiculous. 
IV. POSSIBILITY OF REQUIRED AUDIT ROTATION 
Recently, the PCAOB has entertained thoughts about 
requiring auditing firms be rotated every few years.22 While I 
agree that the PCAOB is rightly concerned about audit failures 
                                                          
 21  Amy Kennedy, Audit Rotation is Not Beneficial in the Long Run, 
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/070_Amy_Kennedy.pdf. 
 22  See generally Public Corporation Accounting Oversight Board, Concept 
Release on Auditor Independence and Audit Firm Rotation, PCAOB Release 
No. 2011-006 (August 16, 2011). 
http://pcaobus.org/Rules/Rulemaking/Docket037/Release_2011-006.pdf. 
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and the lack of professional skepticism,23 I am not wholly 
convinced that changing auditing firms every few years is a 
viable option. 
First, similar to my above discussion about changing audit 
partners every five years, I believe that the PCAOB’s thought 
about changing audit firms every few years is a bit draconian. 
Again, if a client has a good working relationship with its auditor, 
and the end result is transparent, reliable financial statements 
where no one’s integrity or professionalism is at issue, I do not see 
the harm in continuing that relationship for the foreseeable 
future. 
Another legitimate argument against seemingly endless 
auditor rotation is the idea that the client has to perpetually go 
back to square one in showing a new auditing firm the ropes. 
“The argument that auditor change disrupts the company whose 
accounts are being audited has more substance. A new set of 
people arriving at every audit location and having to learn the 
ropes is likely to be a bit disruptive to well-oiled routines.”24 I do 
not see the efficacy of clients playing “musical chairs” with their 
auditors every few years. 
Next, SOX has been unambiguous in prohibiting auditing 
firms from providing non-audit services to the same clients for 
whom they are doing audit work.25 If a large part of the problem 
was that supposedly independent auditing firms provided tax, 
business consulting and other services to the audit clients, Section 
201 of SOX did away with that problem. The general perception 
was that auditing firms used their audit work for their clients as a 
hook to sell their non-audit services to those same clients. 
In my opinion, it is precisely because SOX drew a bright 
line between the acceptable and prohibited services that auditors 
can now provide for their clients. In other words, Section 201 has 
already removed the pressure for auditors to do non-audit work 
for their audit clients. Therefore, in my opinion, the idea to rotate 
auditing firms is overbroad. 
                                                          
 23  Id. at 6. 
 24  Eric Tracy, Arguments Against Auditor Rotation Appear Desperate, 
ACCOUNTANCY AGE, (June 11, 2012), available at 
http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/opinion/2183068/arguments-auditor-
rotation-appear-desperate. 
 25  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §201, 15 U.S.C. §78j-1 (2002). 
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V. DISGORGEMENT OF PROFITS UNDER SECTION 304 
Section 304 of SOX provides the following: 
(a) ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION PRIOR TO 
NONCOMPLIANCE WITH COMMISSION 
FINANCIAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS- If an 
issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement 
due to the material noncompliance of the issuer, as a 
result of misconduct, with any financial reporting 
requirement under the securities laws, the CEO and 
CFO of the issuer shall reimburse the issuer for— 
(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based 
compensation received by that person from the issuer 
during the 12-month period following the first public 
issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first 
occurs) of the financial document embodying such 
financial reporting requirement; and 
(2) any profits realized from the sale of securities of the 
issuer during that 12-month period.26 
Section 302 places the ultimate responsibility for the 
veracity of a corporation’s financial information on the CEO and 
CFO.27 Thus, the CEO and CFO must certify that there are no 
material misstatements or omissions within the financial 
statements, are responsible for the company’s internal controls, 
and must promptly report any internal control lapses to the 
corporation’s audit committee.28 In response to the parade of 
corporate officers who testified that they were unaware of their 
companies’ creative accounting prior to SOX’ enactment, SOX 
section 302 seems to be an appropriate response imposing strict 
liability on the CEO and CFO if the company’s financial 
statements are in fact fraudulent. 
Section 304, however, requires only the CEO and CFO to 
disgorge their profits if the financial statements are to be 
recalculated due to fraud. While it is true that SOX imposes 
“buck stopping” sanctions on the CEO and CFO in the spirit of 
management accountability, I’m not wholly convinced that 
                                                          
 26  Id. §304, 15 U.S.C. §7243. 
 27  Id. §302, 15 U.S.C. §7241. 
 28  Id. 
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Section 304 is always fairly applied. 
If the CEO and CFO knew, or at least had reason to know 
that the financial statements were fraudulent, then of course they 
should suffer the consequences. However, is it fair for the CEO 
and CFO to take the fall for someone else’s defalcation? 
Obviously, there is an element of risk assumption when one takes 
a position of a Chief Executive or Chief Financial Officer. What 
happens if 1) the CEO and CFO perform their jobs competently 
and in good faith, and 2) there is very little nexus between top 
management and lower level employees who are actually 
responsible for the financial statement fraud? 
For example, I am a low level accountant for XYZ 
Company. I report to the accounts payable manager, who reports 
to the controller, who reports to the CFO. XYZ Company is a 
publicly traded corporation who generated $600 million in 
revenue, and netted $140 million in profits. Unbeknownst to my 
supervisors, I generate fictitious invoices payable to various shell 
companies, thus embezzling $426,082 from the company. 
Compared to $140 million, what is a mere $426,082? 
Although I was able to steal over four hundred thousand 
dollars right under my company’s nose, the company’s profits are 
understated because of my fraud. Additionally, the company’s 
employees all receive year-end bonus checks in varying amounts, 
including the CFO, who receives a $250,000 bonus. Even though 
I perpetrated the fraud, I even received a bonus of $500. 
Assuming my fraud is ultimately discovered, and the 
financial statements are restated as a result. The CFO, through 
no fault of his own, has to repay his $250,000 back to XYZ 
Company. Ironically, Section 304 does not have a similar 
disgorgement requirement for any employee other than the CEO 
and CFO. Thus, I the embezzler, would keep my $500 bonus 
check. Of course, there are many other remedies that the 
company can pursue against me (both criminally and in tort); I 
am not suggesting that I could walk away untouched. Just the 
same, however, I believe Section 304 can produce an unduly 
harsh, unfair result where the CFO takes the hit for my misdeeds. 
The punishment just does not fit the crime. 
If the CFO in this hypothetical can prove by the 
preponderance of the evidence that he exercised due diligence, 
and a reasonable investigation would not have uncovered my 
theft, then the CFO should not have to return his bonus to the 
corporation. As a low level accountant, I probably would not 
have much contact with the controller, and even less contact with 
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the CFO. If there is practically no nexus between myself and the 
CFO, I cannot see the justification for the CFO being penalized 
by my thievery, especially if the CFO did his job within the rules. 
If I have a good working knowledge of my company’s 
internal control devices, I can plan my embezzlement in such a 
way that I stay within the firm’s internal control parameters. As 
long as I am under the radar, my activities would not raise any 
red flags during an internal or external audit. Again, I believe 
that it is grossly unfair for the CFO to take the fall for something 
that was my own creation that had nothing to do with him. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
I have shown several examples where certain provisions of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley statute could unintentionally lead to harsh 
results. To be fair, the massive corporate accounting scandals the 
country had been exposed to necessitated a legislative response. 
As such, I do not suggest that SOX has been a failure. In key 
areas, I believe that SOX has been successful. First, corporate 
managers retain the ultimate responsibility for the information 
submitted to the general public. Secondly, SOX has mandated 
that auditors just do audit work and nothing else for their audit 
clients.29 Thus, SOX has been fairly successful. 
Have some people slipped through the cracks and not 
lived up to the level of professional skepticism?30 Unfortunately, 
yes. In those cases, the firms in question were properly sanctioned 
for their part in their audit failures. That said, can we 
automatically assume that the professional integrity of all 
auditing firms is for sale to the highest bidder? I think not. Are all 
auditing firms “in bed” with their clients? As was seen with 
Arthur Andersen and Enron, unfortunately some are. However, I 
believe, perhaps naïvely, that most auditors are not in bed with 
                                                          
 29  Daniel L. Goelzer, Auditing Under Sarbanes-Oxley: An Interim Report, 
7 BUS. & SEC. L. 1, 3 (2006). 
 30  See, e.g, Richard Crump, Baker Tilly criticised for lack of professional 
scepticism, ACCOUNTANCY AGE, (May 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.accountancyage.com/aa/news/2173716/baker-tilly-criticised-lack-
professional-scepticism; Michael Foster, PCAOB Fines Ernst & Young $2 
Million, BIG 4, (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www.big4.com/ernst-
young/pcaob-fines-ernst-young-2-million/. 
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their clients. What I really take exception to is the unspoken 
perception that auditors are automatically either compromised or 
on the take. This is similar to the general perception of attorneys 
as nothing more than unethical hired guns, which I think is just 
as inaccurate. 
Thus, in the Congressional haste to come up with an 
appropriate response to Enron, World-Com, Tyco, and the rest, I 
believe that SOX committed a touch of overkill in the pursuit of 
accounting integrity. As shown above, this overkill takes the form 
of unjustly penalizing current professionals for someone else’s 
prior misdeeds. In certain instances, the “punishment” does not a 
fit the crime. I do not believe that the legislative intent was to 
impose overly harsh restrictions on financial reporting. 
Unfortunately though, Sections 203, 206, and 304 lend themselves 
to certain situations where an individual can suffer inequitable 
consequences for someone else’s misconduct. And adding injury 
to insult, the individual forced to retroactively pay for someone 
else’s financial crimes has no legal recourse. Not only is this 
unfair, but the fact that these “loopholes” have not been 
adequately addressed in the ten-plus years of Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
existence guarantees that the hidden unfairness of a supposedly 
remedial statute will continue unabated. 
 
 
 
